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FOREWORD 
Fostering growth and efficiency is the prime concern of planning, 
policy-making and economic management in the Caribbean countries. 
These aims are vitally important during the current severe crisis 
that most countries have been experiencing due to external factors. 
Not only has the international recession continued to decrease 
the demand for major exports but also the worsening of the fiscal 
and foreign exchange situation has affected the public investment 
programs and has led to debt servicing problems. 
All the Governments acknowledge the seriousness of the situation 
and have taken steps to speed up the process of adjustment and 
recovery. They are strongly determined to fulfill the hopes for 
full employment and improved standards of work and living. 
This paper has been written as a background document for the 
V Conference of Ministers and Heads of Planning of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It reviews the effects of the international 
recession and the ways and means employed by the countries to cope 
with their most serious consequences. It also considers the views 
of the most important regional organizacions about the role that 
planning and policy making may have in adjusting the economies and 
recovering a path of sustained and equitable growth. 
The document was prepared by the Director of Research Programmes 
of ILPES with the assistance of Mr. Swinburne Lestrade and the 
cooperation of the ECLAC Office for the Caribbean. The work tried 
to survey all the experiences of the English-Speaking Caribbean. 
However, due to the lack of adequate materials, some of the cases 
had to be omitted. 
Being this a preliminary report, ILPES acknowledges the comments 
that may be deemed appropiate for a final publication. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is proposed in this document to analize the extent to which 
the international recession of 1980-82 affected economic policy 
and planning in the Caribbean. The discussion will deal largely 
with the cases of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago 
and the OECS Countries. Opportunity will be taken to discuss 
possible forms of external assistance to the OECS Countries in 
planning and economic management. Throughout we shall be making 
certain observations which touch on the concept of adjustment as 
it applies to Caribbean Countries. 
Economic planning has been developed and carried out in different 
ways within the CARICOM Region. Since the Second World War only 
Barbados and Jamaica can be said to undertake systematic efforts 
to produce a planning document reflecting the totality of the 
countries® policy strategies and objetives within a long-term time 
frame. In Trinidad and Tobago, where three five-year plans had 
been produced, such long-term planning was discontinued in the 
mid-1970s, but new efforts are underway. In most countries, planning 
is understood as the coordinated management of public policies. 
One conclusion which follows from this study is that it becomes 
rather difficult to relate international circumstances to the 
achievement or otherwise of agreed macro-economic objectives and 
targets. This requires that attention should focus on the annual 
statements by finance ministers of their countries' economic and 
financial proposals over a twelve-month period. The annual budget 
presentations constitute the major planning document for the 
countries and analysis of these is essential to comprehend macro-
economic and sectoral growth objectives and to appreciate the 
changing responses adn adjustments to the vicissitudes of the 
national and international economic situations. 
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Inherent in this, is the further implication that because 
the planning periods are so short, it is rather more difficult 
to determine very precisely the extent to which apparent changes 
in policy are a consequence of international events. 
It would in any event be difficult to establish a precise 
relationship between economic policy and progress in the respective 
countries, and international economic recession. The establishment 
of such possible relationship would require a more quantitative 
treatment of the subject than is possible in this presentation. 
Even in situations where planning documents did exist, the objectives 
situations in the CARICOM countries, i.e., essentially those of 
openness and dependency, would render any attempts at a consistent 
approach to long-term planning something quite difficult. Countries 
in the Caribbean are almost fully absorbed into the international 
economic system, the effects of which are quickly reflected in 
the countries' economic performance. 
Recognizing the obstacles and opportunities posed by the inter-
national linkages, steps need to be taken for upgrading the level 
of planning as a coordinated process of decision-making. Up to 
now planning has played a limited role and in most of the experiences 
it is associated as said to the concept of national economic management 
and to the practice of drafting plans, programmes and projects as 
a pre-condition for requesting external financing. With some 
exceptions, the traditional form of planning has been concentrated 
in the preparation of public investment programmes but in some cases 
without controlling certain key policy instruments and without an 
adequate institutional machinery. 
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Planning and coordination of public policies seems to be the 
best way of developing the potential of economies and for coping 
with the challenges posed by external events. Finally, planning 
could contribute to undertake comprehensive adjustment programs 
to assess their financial implications and the needed longer-term 
structural changes. 
II. DEVELOPMENT PLANS, EFFECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RECESSION AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS-. 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 
It is proposed in this chapter to take an overview of the extent 
to which the international recession of 1980-82 affected economic 
policy and planning in the Caribbean. The discussion will consider 
the cases of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and 
the OECS Countries. 
1. Recessionary impact and adjustment on Caribbean countries 
As with developing countries worldwide, so also in the case 
of Caribbean countries the effects of the international recession 
varied in nature and extent. Yet there were broad similarities, 
namelys 
i) Import reductions deriving from stagnant or declining 
foreign exchange earnings, reduced foreign capital inflows or 
(significantly in the cases of the OECS Countries) reduced levels 
of remittances from overseas nationals, and cutbacks in development 
imports; 
ii) Declining government revenues due to reduced economic 
activity, the stagnation in trade and the difficulty of imposing 
new taxes during the recession; 
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iii) Cutbacks in investment plans and the slowdown of on going 
projects because of shortages of domestic and external funds. 
The foregoing were more or less applicable to all of the 
CARICOM Member States. 
To counteract the described effects, the approaches to adjust-
ment employed by Caribbean Countries contained policy measures 
directed to restore the external and internal equilibrium. The 
former included greater export-orientation of productive activity; 
reduction of current account deficits by foreign exchange devaluation 
and import budgeting; and heavy external borrowing. While the 
latter implied decreases in expenditure on social services; cutbacks 
in subsidies to consumers; and restraining monetary policy. In 
some cases, these measures were accompanied by deregulation of the 
economy and a deliberate policy of encouraging private enterprise 
and by more concerted and systematic approaches to macro-economic 
management and economic policy frameworking. 
Beyond the adjustment measures adopted, one should recognice 
the existence of longer-term issues, namely: 
i) The countries all face the long-term problem of their structural 
transformation, i.e., the need for a more fundamental change in 
existing structures and patterns of production and trade and 
institutional arrangements, in a way which can make for sustained 
economic growth and a sustained improvement in living standards. 
The adjustment measures that Caribbean countries fundamentally 
require are those that relate to this longer-term while the kind 
that the countries have had to put in place as a response to the 
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crisis should be viewed as only the begining of a systematic 
process of longer-term structural adjustment; 
ii) The nature of the economic policies pursued by the countries 
over the 1960s and 197 0s has been an important determinant of the 
nature and extent of the adjustment which has been required in the 
early 1980s; 
iii) Given the open, dependent nature of their socio-economic 
systems, planning and policy options for adjustment are limited. 
Planning and policy options in the smaller OECS Countries are even 
more limited; while their central banking arrangements may be 
deemed to protect them from some of the possible ravages of inter-
national recession, these arrangements also stricture their scope 
for policy manoeuvering; 
iv) It is inevitable that short or longer-term adjustment will 
have a regional dimension. This derives from the common market 
arrangements which, to a significant extent, remove from the sphere 
of national decision-making, action relating to foreign trade and 
protection. The Nassau decision 1/ betray a commendable determination 
on the part of Caribbean Governments to come to terms with the 
requisites of adjustment, although one might have expected some 
of their decisions on intraregional trade to have been more fully 
considered and less hastily taken. 
1/ See Heads of Government of Member States in the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), The Nassau Understanding. Structural Adjust-
ment and Closer Integration for Accelerated Development in the 
Caribbean Community, Nassau, 4-7 July, 1984. 
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2• Some country experiences 
a) Barbados 
i) Planning and the strategy formulated 
Barbados is one of the small number of Caribbean countries 
where development planning can be said to be institutionalized, 
with a well organized planning mechanism. In 1978 the Government 
established a planning and priorities committee, a sub-committee 
of the Cabinet to oversee the planning process and direct plan 
formulation and implementation. 
Five development plans have been produced since the country 
attained independence in 1966. The fourth such plan addresses 
the period April 1979 to March 1983. 
The gross domestic product at factor cost was projected to grow 
at an average annual rate of 4% in real terms between 1978 and 1983. 
The thrust of this growth was expected to come from tourism and 
manufacturing, for which the projected growth rate were 7.4% and 
7.8% respectively. Construction was expected to grow by 5% per 
annum, and sugar by 3.5%. 
Structurally, by the end of 1983 manufacturing would have 
increased its contribution to GDP from 11.3% in 1978 to 13.5% 
and tourism from 11.6% to 13.6%. The other sector's contributions 
were to have remained more or less steady over the period. 
The overall objectives of the development strategy for the 
1980s were: 
1. Maximizing GDP growth, production and employment opportunities, 
consistent with budgetary and balance of payments constraints; 
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2. Greater economic diversification through continued structural 
transformation of the economy. 
3. Diversified patterns of production of goods and services. 
The development strategy sought to achieve: 
a) A marked increase in employment opportunities and output 
from the productive sectors; 
b) A reduction in the rate of inflation; 
c) A substantial improvement in the balance of payments; 
d) An increase in the opportunities for the population to 
satisfy their basic needs; 
e) Greater self-sufficiency in the economy; 
f) A marked improvement in resource management; 
g) A continued income redistribution process. 
ii) Economic performance and effects of the international 
economic recession 
Over the period 1981/1982, the effects of the international 
recession were felt severely. Gross domestic product in 1981 
declined by 2.4%, the first fall since 1975. By 1982 this decline 
was 4.7%, reflecting a lower contribution from the country's most 
important sectors, sugar and tourism. In 1981 the index of retail 
prices registered a small rise over the already high increase of 
1978 and 1980 (13.1% and 14.4% repsectively). The government 
registered a drastic reduction in its surpluses on current 
account with an increasing overall fiscal deficit. The level of 
external borrowing in 1981 almost doubled that of 1981. As a 
consequence the country's national debt rose by Bd$ 190 millions 
in 1981. Foreign debt service payments increased in 1981 to 
Bd$ 11.9 millions or the equivalent of 1.4% of current account 
earnings. 
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In 1981 the country's balance of payments came under intense 
pressure. The negative balance on current account worsened 
considerably - Bd$ 54 millions in 1980 to Bd$ 201 millions in 
1981. The country's main export, sugar, was adversely affected 
by both declining production, the depressed world sugar market 
and the depreciated value of the pound sterling in which the price 
of exported sugar is denominated. Tourism earnings were adversely 
affected by depressed conditions in the mayor industrial countries, 
the main source markets for the country's tourism sector. 
iii) Policy Measures, 1982-1984 
The Government of Barbados obtained medium-term balance 
of payments financing of US$ 50.5, under the International Monetary 
Funds (IMF) scheme for compensating export shortfalls and secured 
a three-year borrowing arrangement with the Fund, extending to 
May, 1984. This arrangement provided the framework for the 
country's monetary and fiscal policy over the period. 
Monetary and fiscal policy included: 
1. Reduction of capital expenditure in nominal and real terms, 
and the deliberate decision to support only ongoing projects or 
those which were already receiving institutional support; 
2. Strict control of the growth of current expenditure by the 
streamlining of policy services; 
3. Credit and hire purchase controls to stem the flow of foreign 
exchange which would otherwise result from increased domestic 
spending; 
4. Narrowing the differential between domestic and international 
interest rates as a means of reducing the outflow of capital for 
speculative and other purposes; 
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5. Strong public sector support for wage restraint; 
6. Imposition of additional tax revenue measures. 
During 1981 to 1982, the Central Bank operated a policy of 
selective credit controls and interest rates were kept in line 
with overseas rates in order to avoid giving encouragement to 
negative trade credits or profit repatriation. The Central Bank 
also began to give more assistance to sectors in difficulty, 
especially sugar and manufacturing; the Central Bank's support 
measures included rediscount measures, price support schemes and 
export credit guarantee schemes. 
Under Barbados' standby arrangement with the Fund, the Barbados 
Government was committed to limiting new short-term and medium-
term foreign debt of the Government to US$ 35 millions during the 
stand-by period. Performance targets were agreed for net domestic 
assets* the banking system's credit to the Government and short-
term and medium-term foreign borrowing. 
The Central Bank maintained a tight money policy throughout 
the year, and was constantly on guard against the possibility 
that the public sector borrowing requirement might crowd out the 
flow of credit to the producing sectors. 
iv) Concluding Observations 
During the period 1980-83, the economy of Barbados 
appears to have successfully weathered the storm clouds of the 
international recession. Barbados was able to satisfy the per-
formance criteria agreed with the IMF without severe difficulty, 
although the continued poor performance of the foreign exchange 
earnings sectors, as well as illiquidity deriving from the demise 
- 10 -
of the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility, made it necessary 
to carefully monitor the balance of payments. 
The policy-makers recognized the need for urgent adjustments 
to be made to monetary and fiscal policy and were able to execute 
a process of prudent economic management. Appropriate sector 
adjustment were pursued with vigour, and in manufacturing a vigorous 
drive to support industrial growth and to facilitate its export 
orientation was carried through. 
In all this Barbados was considerably facilitated by its tra-
dition of political and economic stability and a willingness to 
come to terms with the requisites of serious economic management. 
The adjustments which took place were accompanied by its inevi-
table costs of reduced growth and living standards but may have 
performed an important role in laying the basis for continued 
sound economic management in the future, and for successful long-
term structural adjustment. 
Yet the policies of the day were more in the nature of balance 
of payments financing and expenditure management rather than 
fundamental or structural. The strategy of Barbados' policy-makers 
appeared to be one of a deliberate process of guided development 
in directions which were presumed to be essentially correct. 
b) Guyana 
i) Planning and the strategy formulated 
Guyana was perhaps the first country to give strong 
emphasis to economic self-reliance involving import substitution, 
import restrictions, foreign exchange budgeting cind deliberate 
encouragement of indigenous enterprise. The Government embarked 
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on a policy of state-ownership and control of the country's major 
assets, so that by the late 1970s, approximately 80% of the 
country's productive assets was state owned. 
The strategy was perhaps too inward-looking with insufficient 
attention to the encouragement of non-traditional exports. In 
the face of declining performance of the traditional exports 
(bauxite, rice and sugar), the economy was unable to maintain 
economic activity levels or to generate private sector activity. 
These were rendered extremely difficult by crippling foreign 
exchange shortages. 
Economic deterioration in Guyana had set in since the mid-197 0s 
and was at an advanced stage by 1980. The international economic 
recession had the effect of rendering more difficult the attempts 
on the part of the Government to begin to come to terms with economic 
decline. Its major export earners, sugar and bauxite, performed 
poorly due to declining output on soft international markets. 
Economic decline was so far advanced in Guayana that it led to a 
reversal of economic philosophy and strategy aimed at improving 
the country's economic situation. 
Adjustment options were surely very difficult because consumption 
levels were already very low, and further cuts to maintain invest-
ment could only have implied particularly severe social and human 
costs. 
1. Economic strategy in the early 1980s II . I I - - - 1 1 - .__ ! - - ' I I I I TP I 
The economic strategy in operation in the early 1980s, was 
aimed at economic self-reliance. The provision of the basic 
needs of food, clothing and housing was to be given priority as 
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well as the relief of the poorest and most disadvantaged of the 
society. The capital programme had certain clearly defined 
objectives. It's broad emphases were in the areas of agriculture 
(including fisheries), manufacturing and industry, and the social 
sectors of health, housing and education; its specific objectives 
were to complete or speed up ongoing projects, recommence work 
which had been suspended and rehabilitate and upgrade existing 
facilities. 
The program initiated in 1980 was designed to stem the deterior-
ation of the economy, stimulate economic growth and restore balance 
of payments equilibrium. The program comprised a broad development 
policy strategy and specific action directed at selected sectors. 
The broad development strategy, included the removal of price 
distortions, improvements in the productivity of labour, increased 
agricultural yields, and improvement in the relationship between 
the Government and the private sectors, particularly through the 
removal of obstacles to private initiative. Efforts were directed 
at improving growth performance which was predicated on the successful 
execution of the public sector investment program. The sector 
policies pertained to energy resource development and conservation, 
export development, especially related to sugar, rice, fisheries, 
timber, bauxite/alumina and non-traditional manufactures, rational-
ization of pricing policies, and improving organizational and 
managerial efficiency. In addition the strategy included measures 
for mobilizing domestic resources, higher expenditure control, 
improved productivity and output and interest rate adjustment. 
2. Economic performance 1980-1982 
The economy suffered a decline in export volumes and terms of 
trade during the period 1980 to 1982. 
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In 1980, the recovery of the bauxite sector exports from the 
depressed level of 1979 and favourable price developments for all 
principal comodities contributed to a more than 30% increase in 
export earnings. In 1981, however, output of all major export 
commodities declined from the 1980 level (except in the case of 
sugar) and continued to remain far below capacity level. As a 
result, export volumes remained below the targets set in the 
structural adjustment program, and except for sugar were lower 
than for 198 0. The combined effect of the declines in export 
volumes and a drop in average export prices, due mainly to a 15% 
drop in average sugar prices, was an 11% decline in the value of 
merchandise exports. In 1982, export performance continued to be 
disappointing, with the value of exports falling again by 26%. 
The balance of payments deteriorated during 1979-1982. Net 
international reserves fell by US$ 137 millions during 1979-1980, 
and gross reserves dropped to less than two weeks of imports by 
the end of 1980. In 1982, the current account of the balance of 
payments showed some improvement with the deficit narrowing but 
remaining at a high 33% of GNP. The sharp drop in export earnings 
and the absence of significant amount of capital inflows led to a 
sharp drop in the level of merchandise imports by about one-third 
in real terms. 
Payments on external debt soared from nearly G$ 50 millions 
in 1978 to G$ 150 millions in 1982. This rapid accumulation of 
debt coupled with the sharp fall in export earnings caused consider-
able debt servicing problems to which the Government responded by 
seeking deferral and rescheduling arrangements with commercial 
and institucional creditors. 
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In an effort to arrest the rapidly deteriorating foreign 
exchange situation, the Government in mid-1981 devalued the 
Guyanese currency by about 15% vis-a-vis the US dollar. 
Regarding global and sectoral production, for the first time 
since 1976, the economy achieved real growth of 2% in 1980, but 
the downward trend in real output evidenced during the latter half 
of the 1970s continued during 1981. The three major industries 
in the economy - sugar, rice and bauxite experienced serious 
shortfalls in their production targets and gross domestic product 
was only 1% higher than that attained in 1980. 
Foreign exchange shortages affected production in 1981. Real 
gross domestic output declined by about 9%. The output of calcined 
bauxite and alumina which had declined in 1981 fell again by 23% 
and 57% respectively as production was constrained by weak inter-
national demand. Sugar output fell by about 5% and rice output 
increased by 10%. 
The financial performance of the public sector during 1981 
reflected the production, real expenditure and price trends in 
the wider economy, and the current deficit reached a record 13% 
of GDP. 
In 1982, the sharp deterioration in the fiscal situation and 
the lack of imported inputs for investment, which reflected the 
absence of significant capital and aid inflows, necessitated a 
severe reduction in the level of public investment, which was 
reduced to about a quarter below the budgeted level, implying 
a decline in real terms of about one-third. 
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Monetary developments and in particular the rapid growth in 
credit during the period 1980-1982, largely reflect the deterioration 
of the performances of the Government sector. During 1980-1982, 
credit expanded rapidly as the public sector resorted to the 
banking system to finance about two-thirds of its overall deficit. 
The combination of high public sector deficits and the increased 
unavailability of imports led to increases in the rate of inflation 
during the period 1980-1982. The rate of inflation as measured 
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 13% in 1980, given the 
openness of the economy partly reflecting international price 
movements; and by 22% in 1981 reflecting the combined effects of 
devaluation, additional consumption taxes and the upward adjustment 
of a number of price controlled items in early 1981. During 1982, 
the CPI again rose by 20% far above the level of international 
inflation - as the foreign exchange shortage led to increasing 
commodity shortages. 
ii) Revisions introduced to economic strategy 
By the end of 1981 it became evident that in order to 
cope with the continuing decline of the economy, the economic 
program needed to be broadened and strengthened. The Government 
therefore, in 1982 adopted a program aimed at improving the 
efficiency in production by strengthening and rationalizing the 
management of the public sector and limiting its operations to 
those it could efficiently manage, by encouraging the expansion 
of the private sector, by decentralizing public sector functions, 
and by rationalizing controls and the regulatory framework. The 
main measures of the program were: 
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a) The conclusion of a partnership arrangement with a foreign 
company in the bauxite industry; 
b) A reduction in the scope of activities of the Guyana Rice 
Board, the adoption of a rice pricing policy to maintain adequate 
producer prices and a review of the rice marketing arrangements 
to ensure optimal returns to producers and the economy; 
c) Adjustments in remunerations to attract and retain technicians 
in the agricultural sector, a strengthening of regional agricultural 
institutions, and review of land tenure and holding policies; 
d) Measures to expand manufacturing, particularly for exports 
including the adoption of a comprehensive investment code, import 
tax concessions, priority allocation of foreign exchange and the 
establishment of a joint public/private export council; 
e) The limitation of public sector enterprises in manufacturing 
to existing activities, a strengthening of public sector enterprise 
management through technology and marketing partnership arrangements, 
and equity participation by the foreign and domestic private sector 
in existing public sector enterprises; 
f) The continued application of measures agreed under the 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan and the IDB' s Agricultural 
Sector Loan, including efforts to improve savings through a restraint 
Government spending and an increase in interest rates; and 
g) A strengthening of the Government's administrative systems 
and institutions, based in part on IDB - financed assistance in 
planning. 
In 1982, the Government held consultations with the IMF with 
a view to reducing the public sector deficit. Discussions also 
took place with the World Bank in relation to the effort to raise 
production in the major sectors. There was agreement on an Action 
Programme with the World Bank to restore the bauxite and rice 
sectors. 
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In early 1982, the Government also established the Export 
Development Fund (EDF) whose function was to promote non tradicional 
exports» Given the severity of the foreign exchange shortage, 
the EDF was the main source of foreign exchange for the manufacturing 
sector in 1982, particularly for private enterprises. Towards the 
end of 198 2 the level of operation of the EDF was reduced because 
its resources were not revolving as had been envisaged. 
Adjustment policies also necessitated an increase in producer 
prices payable to rice farmers, an increace in the domestic price 
of rice and in electricity tariffs. Another important policy 
change relates to rice marketing. Farmers and millers were allowed 
to sell rice directly to retailers and consumers in competition 
with the Guyana Rice Board, which remained the sole exporter of 
rice. 
iii) Overall evaluation of the adjustment process 
By the end of 1983 the Guyana economy showed no signs 
of reversing the trend set in 1981, and the economy continued to 
decline even further. Since the performance of the economy has a 
marked impact on the finances of the public sector - which largely 
accounts for the internal gap - this gap continued to widen, as 
the public sector deficit increased. Capital inflows to finance 
this deficit did not materialized and private sector borrowing 
only generated a fraction of it, leading to an increase in borrowing 
from the banking system. 
Given the shortfall in production and the subsequent poor 
export performance, there was no greater success in closing the 
external gap. Export earnings from the three major commodity 
exports were 27.5% below the budgeted amount and 18.8% less than 
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1982. Total export earning therefore fell below both the 1982 
and targeted 1983 levels. As a result, the deficit on the current 
account did not fall to the planned level, despite the contraction 
in the value of imports over the year. 
Given the low level of capacity utilization in the productive 
sectors and the country's rich resource endowment, there is no 
doubt that with substantial external assistance (largely on 
concessionary terms) and structural changes in the management 
and organization of the economy, Guyana is capable of achieving 
adequate rates of growth in output and exports and servicing of 
its debt obligation. However, because it is unlikely that timely 
arrangements could be put in place to make critically necessary 
imported inputs available to the productive sector, economic 
performance in 1984-1985 is difficult to be any better than that 
of 1983 in real terms. The prospects for 1984-1985 are also 
affected by the conclusion of a programme with the IMF which 
could in turn influence the availability of additional external 
assistance from the multilateral agencies. External inflows are 
needed to provide rehabilitation-type investment resources in order 
to complete those projects temporarily abandoned for lack of 
domestic counterpart funds and to provide working capital for 
productive enterprises. 
c) Jamaica 
i) Planning and the strategies formulated 
Prior to the 1978-1982 development plan, Jamaica had 
three development plans but in their course, conditions changed 
so drastically that the patterns of expenditure and the financing 
of these programmes could not be met as set out in the planning 
documents. 
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The 5-year development plan of 1978-1982 had as its objectives 
the followings 
1. Consolidation and development of a mixed economy in which the 
state owned or controlled the basic industries of the economy, 
while ample scope was left for private sector initiative and 
involvement,, 
2. To provide an adequate supply and an effective and equitable 
distribution of necessities to the masses of the population. 
3. To promove social justice, social and economic egalitarianism 
and participatory forms in the society. 
4. To reconcile spatial and physical planning with the objectives 
of community development, rural development and balanced regional 
development. 
5. To diversify foreign relations policy both on a bilateral 
basis and through continuing multilateral efforts. 
The advent of a new Government in Jamaica towards the end of 
198 0 led to a fundamental reversal of economic philosophy and 
strategy. The new Government's response to the international 
economic situation was reflected in a set of arrangements 
negotiated with the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund during 1981-82. 
The package of measures included both financing and adjustment 
measures. The Government sought to increase external borrowings 
and to implement a set of adjustment measures linked to the IMF 
support arrangements, intended to bring about quick and substantial 
incremental foreign exchange earnings, and "to initiate adjustments 
in industrial and agricultural policies and so provide a basis for 
expansion of productive capacity, with concommitant increases in 
employment opportunities." 
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An important plank of the economic strategy was to "deregulate 
the economy, build up private sector confidence and support the 
operation of an efficient market economy". 
Adjustment measures also included; 
- export stimulation; 
- foreign exchange control measures; 
- exchange rate adjustment; 
- restraining fiscal and monetary policies. 
ii) Impact of the international economic recession and 
economic performance 1981-1983 
Jamaica had been going through a difficult period prior 
to the onset of the international recession in 1980. Gross Domestic 
Product had been declining every year since 1975 (except for a 
0.3. increase in 1978). In 1980, the decline was of the order 
of 5.4%. By 1980, the adverse movement on the merchandise trade 
account, coupled with a net outflow of property and entrepreneurial 
income, had led to a large increase in the deficit on the current 
account of the balance of payments. As at end December, 1980, the 
country's net foreign exchange reserves had fallen by US$ 232 millions 
to minus US$ 453.5 millions. There was also a considerable deterior-
ation in the Central Government's fiscal position., 
Jamaica's balance of payments problems during the crisis can 
be broadly attributed to two categories of factors: 
1. External 
2. Domestic policies and structural factors. 
External factors 
- Oil price increases and terms of trade 
Jamaica relies on imported fuel for almost all its energy 
requirements. A more fundamental cause of these difficulties, 
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however is linked to the country's high level of petroleum consump-
tion. Until 1973 oil imports never exceeded 10% of the total 
imports. That figure increased to 38.1% in 1980 and 30% in 1983, 
though the lower figure in 1983 is related to the decline of the 
bauxite/alumina sector which utilizes approximately 50% of all 
fuel imports. 
- World wide recession and falling export demand 
The international recession has had severe repercussions on 
Jamaica's exports especially on the bauxite/alumina industry. 
This sector accounted for approximately 70% of Jamaica's total 
export earnings during 1980-1983 and was responsible for approximately 
23% of ogvernment revenue in fiscal years 1980-1983. This latter 
fell to an estimated 10% during the recession and the production 
fell from 12 million tons in 1980 to 7.7 million tons in 1983. 
Commensurately, the combined value of bauxite and alumina fell 
from US$ 735.7 millions in 1980 to US$ 423.8 millions in 1983 
and government revenue from J$ 334 millions in fiscal year 80/81 
to J$ 188 in 1982-1983. 
- Increase in profit and interest remittances abroad 
Net investment income outflows averaged approximately 25% 
of total earnings during the 1981-1983 period. 
- Net capital inflows 
Net official borrowing moved from US$ 65.7 millions in 1979 
to US$ 446 millions in 1983. These massive borrowing were necessary 
to offset the ever increasing deficits on the current account, 
but even loans of these magnitudes were insufficient. 
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Domestic policies and structural factors 
Import restrictions, the exchange rate system and fiscal 
and monetary policies, were among some of the domestic factors 
that affected the prices of traded goods as well as aggregate 
demand and supply. 
With the enlarged trade deficit (US$ 438.5 millions in 1983) 
and declining net foreign reserves, the official exchange rate 
was held constant until 1983 as efforts were made to control 
inflation which was very high at the time. The 1983 devaluation 
was intended to given back competitive adge to Jamaican producers. 
As a result of the increase in public expenditure, the central 
government deficit widened to about 17% of GDP in fiscal year 
1980-1981, and they remained high during the two following years. 
The structural factors helped to explain the deteriorating 
trend in the current account. Jamaica's exports are dominated 
by four major items: bauxite, alumina, sugar and bananas, which 
together account for approximately 80% of total exports. 
The low level of growth of agriculture during the latter years 
led to increases in imported commodities as the country's agricultural 
self-sufficiency declined. Policies aimed at changing the structure 
of production and the share of the private sector, such as national-
ization of factories on the use of cooperatives, had the effect of 
discouraging agricultural exports. Also, the manufacturing sector 
has not had a good record during the past four years. 
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iii) Concluding observations 
The available data seem to point to serious repercussions 
for the economy deriving from the international economic recession, 
and available information seems to suggest that by end 1983, the 
Government was well placed to achieve practically all of its 
economic performance targets, except those relating to the external 
payments account. However, it may yet be too early to permit 
of a definitive evaluation of Jamaica's adjustment process. 
According to the statement made by the Jamaica's Prime Minister 
in 1984 (and also the economic indicators made available by the 
Government's Planning Institute), "... every one of the targets 
of economic recovery was achieved to an extent unequaled by many 
countries throughout the world". By end 1983 there was, held to 
be "... increased investment, restoration of growth, a reduction 
of the fiscal deficit, a reduction in inflation and a decrease in 
unemployment". The key failure (that relating to balance of 
payments performance), was deemed to be directly attributable to 
the dramatic fall in the exports of bauxite/alumina between 1980 
and 1983, deriving directly from the impact of the international 
recession. 
In the case of Jamaica, there appeared to have been a clear 
concerted approach to the economic policy requisites from the 
early 1980s. Adjustment was -taking place; measures were implemented 
with fixed determination, including exchange restrictions and 
exchange rate depreciation. The case is interesting if only 
because it is the most far-reaching Fund-related balance of 
payments adjustment in the English-speaking Caribbean. It is 
incomplete because, as was admitted by the Jamaica Prime Minister 
in his early 1984 statement, the impact of the adjustment measures 
has not yet begun to be felt positively on the balance of payments. 
- 24 -
The adjustment will be complete when export-oriented manufact-
uring, agro-industry and agriculture can erode the dominance of 
the bauxite/alumina sector in the country's economic calculus, 
and when such enhanced performance of the non-traditional sector 
can become sustained. When that time comes the process will more 
closely resemble structural transformation than the narrower 
concept of adjustment, and the need for structural transformation 
is really what the socio-economic problems of the Caribbean point 
to. 
d) Trinidad and Tobago 
i) Planning and the strategy formulated 
The budget speech of 1980, a document reflective of 
the Goverment's intended strategy, showed a certain degree of 
optimism regarding the country's future. However it took account 
of the fact that the revenues from the petroleum sector could not 
be expected to continue indefinetely and alerted to the danger 
of an excessive overreliance on the petroleum sector. 
By 1980 the petroleum sector contributed two-thirds of the 
Government's current revenue and this provided the essential link 
between the petroleum sector and the rest of the economy. 
In addition to a more rational approach to the planning of the 
energy sector, including the role of natural gas, there was a 
number of measures proposed for conservation of energy. There 
were fiscal measures for the rationalization of the taxation of 
the oil companies and others aimed at rationalizing the expenditure 
of Government departments and subsidising various items of consumption. 
The Government proposed the adoption of a comprehensive programme 
for combating inflation. It embarked on a direct subsidy programme 
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involving basic food and other items such as gasoline and cement. 
There were certain reforms introduced in the income tax structure 
aimed at bringing relief to low income earners. 
The country's agricultural policy was underprived by two broad 
concerns. First the needs of the society as a whole were considered 
particularly as they related to the promotion of overall economic 
development by strengthening the agricultural sector and establish-
ing greater linkages with the rest of the economy; improving the 
nutrition status of the population and natural resource conservation. 
The second major concern related to the welfare of the farmers. 
However, the economic programme and economic policies in effect 
in 1980-1981 did not appear to be geared to address the international 
events of the time, and were determined to a large extent by the 
vicissitudes of the oil price situation and its effects on govern-
ment revenues and the balance of payments. Also there is little 
available evidence to indicate that important policy changes, 
were contemplated as a result of the decline in the performance 
of the economy in 1982. By 1984, however, the budget outlined 
certain adjustment objectives. Prior to the 1984 budget presentation, 
a major planning document had been produced, entitled "The Imper-
atives of adjustment: Draft Development Plan, 1983-1986". 
Besides, in 1983, the Central Bank had instituted a number of 
monetary and financial policies and had introduced in October of 
that year a system of foreign exchange budgeting the main 
objectives of which were: 
1. To slow down the rate of decline of the foreign exchange 
reserves; 
2. To effect a better allocation of foreign exchange among 
competing uses with priority being given to imports of capital 
goods. 
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The 1984 budget explicitly recognized the imperatives of 
adjustment. It gave specific endorsement to the objetives and 
principles of the Draft Development Plan produced by the Demas 
Task Force. This Draft Plan had been previously endorsed by the 
Economic Planning Commission which had been established in mid-1983 
to oversee and give direction to the country's future economic 
strategies. The main planning imperatives adopted were: 
1. A determination of the mix of goods and services to be produced 
and whether the development strategy should be outward or inward 
looking; 
2. A determination of the measures to be used to deal with the 
emerging fiscal and balance of payments problems; 
3. The need for measures to make the economy more competitive 
while sharing the cost of adjustment equitably; 
4. Identification of the criteria to be used to tailor the size 
and composition of Government capital expenditures to the reduction 
in the public sector's available financial resources; 
5. A determination of the kinds of reforms needed in the structure 
and functioning of the public service, the public utilities and 
the state enterprises; 
6. Measures to support the level of employment in the face of the 
slowing down of the economy; 
7. The role and direction of the oil and sugar industries. 
ii) Effects of the world recession on the domestic economy 
and economic performance 
The economy of Trinidad and Tobago, oil exporter, was 
rather favourably positioned by 1980. The economy had been 
registering real growth since 1974, a growth rate of 9.3% being 
recorded in 1977. In 1980 real growth was 5.3%. After 1973 
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there was a drastic change in events relating to the Government's 
financial position. The deficit of TT$ 61.4 millions in 1973 was 
transformed into a large surplus in each of the following years 
to 1980, attributable to the five-fold increase in the price 
of petroleum products. The unemployment situation actually 
improved - 17.3% in 1973, 9.8% in 1980. Inflation was 22% in 
1977 and fell to 17.5% in 1980. The balance of payments current 
account, which had been registering a progressive decline since 
its 1974 high of TT$ 407 millions, registered a surplus of over 
TT$ 900 millions in 1980 (and over TT$ 1 billion in 1981) as a 
result of the oil price increases in 1979. 
As an oil exporter, the economy was to some extent shielded 
from the effects of the international recession, and the imperatives 
of adjustment may have been apparent but not in evidence. By 198 3, 
however, there was cause for concern since the international 
economy had improved during that year, but not the performance 
of the domestic economy. 
In 1983 GDP was estimated to have declined by 6.3%, the first 
decline in the growth rate since mid-1970s. There was a corres-
ponding decline in the performance of the agriculture and petroleum 
sectors. The surplus on merchandise trade account which in 1980 
was TT$ 142 millions was converted into a deficit of TT$ 1 456 
millions by 1982. Since 1980 merchandise exports had been 
declining steadily from TT$ 6 205, in 1980 to TT$ 4 899 millions 
by 1983. In 1982 there was a large current account deficit in 
the balance of payments of TT$ 1 786 millions which increased 
in 1983 to TT$ 2 320 millions. The overall balance of payments 
position which in 1980 was in surplus of TT$ 1 472 millions had 
been transformed into a deficit position of TT$ 2 006 millions. 
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The country's net terms of trade declined from 124.1 in 1980 to 
81.5 by the end of the second quarter of 1983 of TT$ 3 446 millions 
in 1981 the position moved to a deficit of TT$ 14 millions in 1983. 
iii) The adjustment policies 
By comparison with other countries the adjustment measures 
proposed for implementation in Trinidad and Tobago appear mild; it 
is true to say that the circumstances were rather less pressing 
and had not assumed the same crisis proportions. The policies 
implemented or proposed for implementation in 1983-84 included 
such measures as removal of subsidies on consumer items and on 
the services of public utilities, yet it is doubtful that these 
measures can be attributed to the international economic recession 
per se. The economy of Trinidad and Tobago had been facing a 
decline in the early 1970s, and its high growth performance 
in the mid-1907s was in the nature of a windfall deriving from 
the events surrounding the international oil market. These 
circumstances may well have had the effect of delaying the process 
of coming to terms with the structural problems of the economy. 
There were perhaps two dimensions to the adjustment issue: 
1. There was the short-term problem brought about by the recession 
in the industrial countries. This principally concerned the 
reduction of foreign exchange earnings and the consequent need 
to adjust downwards the country's demand for imports to change 
the import composition in favour of essential goods and services; 
2. There was the long-term problem of altering the structure of 
production and improving its competiveness to match the ever-
changing condition of world demand which involves; a reduction 
of dependence on oil and successful development of alternative 
export industries. 
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There was a number of measures implemented to address the 
short-term problem, among which were import budgeting and foreign 
exchange control measures. As in the case of Jamaica the more 
fundamental long-term requirement related to changing the country's 
structure of production and trade. These were the real imperatives 
of adjustment and this is the overriding concern of the Draft 
Development Plan. 
The Government had since the mid-197 0s been taking measures to 
lay the foundation for industrial adjustment through its invest-
ment policies. It had been attempting to move away from a narrow 
and concentrated dependence on the petroleum sector towards a 
broadening of the country's industrial base by developing large 
scale energy-based industries such as iron and steel, ammonia, 
urea and methanol. 
The scenario envisaged for the economy to the year 2000 includes 
the following two elements: 
1. A national economy no longer dominated by petroleum but with 
a diversified production and export base; 
2. The existence of a sound technical and managerial base for 
efficient production in all sectors of the economy. 
Other aspects of the long-term development strategy addressed 
the need for macro-economic planning, including public sector 
investment programming and appropriate monetary and financial 
policies. 
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iv) Concluding Observations 
In Trinidad and Tobago, there was a relative lateness 
of coming to terms with the imperatives of adjustment. The 1984 
budget, influenced by the Report of the Planning Task Force, 
was the first to betray a strong sensitivity to the adjustment 
issue. The delay in adjustment was clearly a function of the 
favourable balance of payments and resource situation deriving 
from the fortunes of the petroleum sector. But for the oil 
price increase of 1979, the nature and the tone of the 1984 budget 
statement may have come rather earlier. 
It is interesting to note the relative mildness of the proposed 
adjustment measures by comparison with other Caribbean States. 
This factor doubtless derives from the relative buoyance of the 
economy over the ten-year period 1974-1984, a situation which 
among other things, would have rendered public acceptance of the 
imperatives of adjustment difficult. 
It is yet too early to assess the impact of the adjustment 
proposals, and in this regard two observations may be made: 
(i) a critical factor in the success of proposed adjustment 
measures may be the question of broad social acceptability, 
and (ii) in the absence of a dramatic reversal in the fortunes 
of Trinidad and Tobago's petroleum sector in future years, more 
serious adjustment may be a sine qua non for arresting economic 
decline and providing a basis for future development. 
e) OECS Countries 
There are important data limitations in the OECS Countries 
which make it difficult to properly assess the importance of inter-
national developments in their economic situations. In the case 
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of these countries the effects of international recession can be 
expected to be felt in: 
i) A falling off in remittances from nationals overseas; 
ii) A declining growth performance of the tourism sector; 
iii) Difficulty in securing additional external financing; 
iv) Declining recurrent revenues due to a falling off in imports. 
There is evidence to indicate that the OECS Countries were 
affected in all four of these ares. In St. Lucia for example, 
travel receipts declined in 1981 although there may have been 
political factors contributing to this fall. The balance of 
payments current account deficit rose in 1982 and in 1983 in spite 
of the fact that total imports fell in 1982 and 1983 below 1981 
levels, this decline being reflected in imports of both inter-
mediate and capital goods. Over the period there was a continuing 
decline in the exchange value of the pound sterling causing a 
loss during the period of more than 25% in the value of the 
country's banana exports. External factors, especially the 
exchange rate factor, had a dampening effect on the country's 
fiscal performance, causing shortfalls in consumption tax, 
customs and stamp duties. 
Available material does not make it easy to determine the 
extent to which there were changes in policy or strategy over 
the period as a consequence of changing domestic or international 
circumstances. 
One OECS country which sought the assistance of the IMF to 
support its economic development efforts was Dominica. In early 
1981, the Government initiated a three-year economic recovery 
programme aimed at improving public sector savings performance, 
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promoting higher levels of foreign aid and investiment, and 
reorientating the investment efforts in order to strengthen the 
balance of payments position. The fiscal programme envisaged 
revenue measures and expenditure restraint to assist in improving 
the current operations of the Central Government. The Government 
secured the assistance of the World Bank in formulating a three-
year investment programme focussing on the restoration and improve-
ment of infrastructure and the diversification and expansion of 
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 
The need for a recovery effort in 1980 was occasioned by the 
decline that characterized the economy in the mid-to late 1970s, 
but more specifically by the natural disasters of 1979 and 1980. 
Real GDP grew by 8% in 1981, 3.5% in 1982 and 4% in 1983. The 
damage to physical infrastructure and productive capacity in 
agriculture was repaired, and implementation of a. major road 
programme commenced in the last quarter of 1983. The rate of 
increase in consumer prices fell from 30% in 198C to 13%% in 1981, 
and in 1982-83 may have been approximately 4%. The central Govern-
ment finances strengthened significantly, and the current account 
deficit on the balance of payments fell from approximately 55%% 
GDP in 1980 to 9%% in 1983. 
Dominica certainly appears to be on the way to recovery from 
the natural disasters of 1979 and 1980. Full recovery will take 
a much longer time and is predicated on continued sound economic 
management and good fortune. 
Much effort will be required in the OECS Countries to ensure 
prudent management of the recurrent budgetary situation, to ensure 
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cost-effective planning of capital expenditure and to vigorously 
promote tourism and investment. To support and complement these 
effrots, macro-economic policies need to be appropriate and 
consistent. 
Two observations are made in relation to the case of OECS 
Countries such as St. Lucia and Dominica. The first relates to 
the fact that the nature of their central banking arrangements 
serves to provide a measure of automatic protection from the 
worst ravages of international recession; because of their 
financial systems they are unlikely to suffer dramatic declines 
in their foreign reserves positions. Pressures on the external 
account would tend to be felt via import contraction, declining 
economic growth, and the worsening of government finances. This 
arrangement allows little scope for changes in fiscal and monetary 
policy, including exchange rate policy. The options of adjustment 
are limited, and also somewhat automatic. 
Secondly, the OECS Countries generally do not have well organized, 
consistent approaches to macro-economic and sectoral planning. 
Clearly articulated, systematic approaches to planning for struc-
tural change need to be adopted and this argues an important case 
for external assistance to the countries of the OECS in these areas. 
i) Required Assistance in Planning 
Capabilities for economic planning and policy formulation 
in the OECS Countries are known to be weak. This weakness is 
essentially reflective of these countries' generally low levels 
of manpower capability in all sections of the public sector. 
From the 197 0s efforts were made in some of the OECS States 
such as Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Kitts/Nevis, to establish 
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planning units, thereby betraing some awareness of the requisites 
of sound economic management, but the countries have generally 
experienced considerable difficulty in sustaining these efforts. 
A sustained capability for economic advise and policy guidelines 
has often also been wanting, there being a dearth within the 
countries of a sufficient number of persons capable of performing 
these roles. Such planning organization, as it has taken place, 
derived partly from some of the implications of borrowing from 
international financial institutions and partly from the interest 
and influence of particular individuals working within the national 
systems. 
A related deficiency is in the area of statistics and statistical 
development, which partly derives from the near absence of macro-
economic planning and the dearth of internal dialogue on macro-
economic policy issues and strategies. The need for statistical 
development in the OECS Countries has been addressed - the United 
Nations Development Programme in particular, has over the last 
ten years invested large sums of money on training nationals of 
OECS States and in more directly assisting in laying down systems 
for outputting national economic accounting data and for organizing 
national statistical offices. It is imperative that these .efforts 
countinue developing, especially when defined to focus on national 
capability in areas like statistics and economic planning and 
policy formulation in countries such as those that characterize 
the OECS. 
Therefore, there needs to be a continuation and intensification 
of efforts to increase the countries' capabilities in statistics and 
statistical appreciation, macro-economic and sectoral planning 
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and economic policy formulation. In view of past efforts and 
failures, innovative approaches are now needed. Ad-hoc seminars 
or workshops are insufficient and need to form part of a sustained, 
well conceived training effort. There may be need for a continuing 
institutional capability within the OECS or CARICOM Region for 
training in economic planning and economic policy issues. For 
this purpose it may be necessary to do no more than re-orientate 
existing programmes to ensure that this identified need is addressed 
adequately. 
Quite apart from formalized training, more provision should be 
made for training on-the-job through the provision of experienced 
economic planners with a training capability. Given the shortage 
of manpower in the OECS States, such on-the-job possiblities, 
with experts provided externally, may be the only means of ensuring 
that OECS nationals receive the required training and exposure. 
The approach must be continuous, innovative and flexible enough 
to adapt to circumstances of particular countries. 
Effective action on the foregoing requires effective planning 
and coordination - which appears to suggest that one of the Caribbean 
regional institutions should include responsibility for these 
functions among its activities. The OECS Secretariat may be 
the logical place for such coordination to take place if it can 
acquire- the required manpower capability. 
It would need to be supported by external assistance. One 
envisages a two-year project, to include one or two experienced 
economic planners in addition to an additional economic planning 
official within the countries, with adequate travel resources for 
the experts and with a sufficient budgetary provision for training 
workshops. 
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This proposal is very much along the lines of the statistical 
development project located at the OECS Secretariat and funded 
by the UNDP. This kind of statistical support is a necessary 
complementary pre-requisite to any more sustained and comprehensive 
approach to macro-economic and sectoral planning. 
ILPES may well have a role in lending technical support to the 
efforts of the OECS States to increase their macro-economic planning 
capability. Such technical support can take the form of assistance 
in the planning and organizing of a planned series of workshops, 
technical support to the regional organizations involved and 
otherwise supporting the efforts of the countries, but this role 
could also be of a more directly supportive nature. It may well 
be necessary for ILPES to have a presence in the Caribbean in a 
way which can result in greater, more continuous benefit to the 
Caribbean Region, and towards this objective ILPES will establish 
a planning unit within the Port of Spain Office of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The major purpose of this Unit could be to carry out perspective 
planning for the OECS Countries. The premise is that for the 
foreseeable future, planning priorities in the OECS Member States 
will inevitably be short-term in horizon and national in focus. 
The responsibility for the wider and the larger view falls to the 
regional institutions to adopt. 
ii) Conclusion 
The foregoing has been a preliminary overview, and these 
conclusions and inferences are only tentative. Adjustments is a 
large, all consuming imperative. If the kinds of adjustments that 
are necessary to respond to changes in the external environment 
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open our eyes to the imperatives of longer-term structural adjust-
ment, then occasional international recessions may be a blessing 
in disguise. 
In the case of the OECS Countries the larger imperative is to 
organize effective approaches to the development of national 
capabilities for economic management and planning. These countries 
may be in a low-level equilibrium trap and large capital inflows 
are required to break out of it. These requirements define the 
role of external financial and technical assistance institutions 
in these countries development. 
III. BASIC TASKS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE 
The effects of the international economic recession on the Caribbean 
countries continues to generate serious problems and the necessity 
to use scarce financial and human resources efficiently and optimally 
is vital to the countries of the sub-region. In this sense, the 
premise for the foreseeable future is that the strategy will 
inevitably be long-term in horizon and national/regional in focus. 
Taking these considerations into account, several institutions 
have made proposals which imply a strengthening of planning efforts 
and improving national economic management. The most important 
are reviewed in what follows, as a framework for the tasks of the 
future. 
1. The Caribbean Development Bank 
The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community 
at their Fourth Meeting in Trinidad and Tobago in July 1983 
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requested the Caribbean Developmen Bank (CDB) to "conduct a study, 
taking into account the views of Member States and other appropriate 
regional institutions, with a view to identifying, evaluating and 
recommending measures of structural adjustment which would maximize 
the production, employment and foreign exchange earnings of 
member countries". 
The study concludes that there is an urgent and continuing 
need for structural adjustment in the region in response to the 
recent deep recession in the industrialized countries and consequent 
protectionism in the developed countries. The study recognizes 
the role of the market and the private sector in the process of 
economic growth and structural transformation, but takes the view 
that there must be a substantial amount of Government involvement 
in the economy under the specific circumstances prevailing in the 
CARICOM countries. In this connection, the study proposes a 
special type of the mixed economy: the guided market economy.1/ 
The report recognizes the need for the availability of adequate 
external financing to help the adjustment programme. Nonetheless, 
the report lays great emphasis on the adoption and implementation 
of appropriate domestic adjustment policies as the best means 
of correcting for any disequilibrium in any national economy. 
The study seeks to highlight the implementation aspects, the 
need for improving the levels of human resource capabilities and 
the necessity of institutional change. 
1/ Caribbean Development Bank, Measures for Structural Adjust-
ment in the Member State of the Caribbean Community, 10th May, 
1984, pp. 154-158. 
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The study recommends a growth strategy based on carefully 
planned production for extra-regional exportation - particularly 
in the manufacturing sector; and it recognizes that fundamentally 
the structural balance-of-payments problems are the manifestation 
of inadequate levels of competitively costed production for export 
and import-substitution. 
Finally, the study takes into account the regional integration 
aspects both as objectives and as means to achieving national goals. 
It warns agains the danger of regional divisiveness and disinte-
gration in well-meaning efforts at structural adjustment at the 
national level. 
Taking into account the effects of the international recession 
on economic policy and planning in the Caribbean, these were the 
proposals submitted to promoting structural adjustment in the 
region. JV 
i) Developing a variant of structural adjustment lending which 
will provide financial support for structural adjustment measures, 
particularly as these relate to the reorganization of critical 
export sectors, without changing the Bank's procurement guidelines 
or reinbursement procedures. 
If the arrangement is acceptable, only a small proportion of 
the Bank's resources will be so channelled and every effort will 
be made to co-finance supply-side oriented programmes with other 
international institutions; 
If Caribbean Development Bank, "Adjustment and Recovery in the 
Caribbean Economies", statement by Mr. William G. Demas at the 
14th annual meeting in Jamaica (May 16-17, 1984). 
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ii) Paying even greater attention to the macro-economic environ-
ment and its impact and implications for major projects. 
The intention here is not to impose macro-economic conditionally 
on project lending, but to identify and to bring to the attention 
of borrowers the macro-economic constraints which may frustrate 
the optimal development of the project and so attempt to improve 
the project's environment; 
iii) Assisting, independently or with other agencies, in develop-
ing the capability for generating a statistical base and engaging 
in economic planning, national economic management and policy 
formulation in the Bank's member counries demanding such assistance. 
Such assistance could be in the form of continued participation 
in national economic management, technical assistance in establishing 
statistical and planning units; and 
iv) Making available to countries, on a request basis, the Bank 
small team of dedicated and committed economists who have been 
collecting data and making analyses of economic performance and 
prospects of the various countries and who assist the borrowing 
member countries in relevant capacities on short assignments. 
Areas in which they can prove useful include: formulation of 
public sector investment programmes; identification of desirable 
economic policies to be pursued and making assessments of their 
macro-economic impact and implications, and in economic planning 
exercises generally. 
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2. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
a) The Nassau Understanding: "Structural Adjustment and Closer 
Integration for Accelerated Development in the Caribbean 
Community" 
Heads of Government of Member States of the CARICOM Meeting 
in Nassau, 4-7 July 1984, reviewed the report on measures for 
structural adjustment in the member state of the Caribbean Community, 
prepared at their request by the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). 
Following upon discussion of the report, they were in general 
agreement with its recommendations. 
From the point of view of planning, these are some of the most 
important conclusions:^/ 
a) The Heads are mindful that their economies should continue 
to rely significantly upon market mechanisms to determine prices 
and the allocation of resources. However, a process of structural 
change cannot under Caribbean conditions be left to evolve through 
spontaneous forces. The objectives of getting prices right will 
be pursued through purpositive national planning that will 
concretely shape the short and long-term directions through which 
the economies can attain their maximum growth potential and satisfy 
basic human needs. 
Accordingly, Governments declare their intention to strengthen 
their machinery for national planning: to involve all sectors of 
their societies in the processes of plan formulation, implementation 
and monitoring; and to strengthen the links between development 
plans and the short-term management of the economy. Careful and 
1/ The Nassau Understanding, Nassau, the Bahamas, July 7, 1984. 
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continuing attention will also be given to the size, composition 
and financing of public sector investment programmes. 
b) It is one of the tasks of planning to extend the arena 
within which all nationals in a position to do so can on their own, 
or with overseas partners, contribute to the aggregate of invest-
ment and production decisions that will accelerate growth and 
development. However, Governments are prepared to do more. In 
appropriate cases particularly where new technology and new markets 
are involved and where local capacities have not sufficiently emerged, 
they will assume a catalitic role in starting new joint ventures 
with local and/or overseas partners. 
An unrelenting drive will be made to enforce operaring efficiency 
in all public sector activity. Consequently, there will be an 
upgrading of the management and functioning of existing state 
enterprises and public utilities. Including giving them the 
autonomy and responsability to operate on strictly commercial 
lines within broad policy guidelines clearly laid down by the 
government. 
The Heads agree that the principal objetive of macro-economic 
policies should be to achieve and sustain a dynamic and rational 
balance between the level, composition and growth of the domestic 
demand for goods and services and their local and regional avail-
abilities. This involves, inter alia, fiscal discipline to keep 
public expenditures within the real resources available to the 
public sector, and the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to 
foster sustained growth and bring about an appropriate balance 
between consumption and investment. Altogether, the overall 
thrust of adjustment policies will be to increase the share of 
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exports and investment in the aggregate demand for goods and 
services, and to expand the contribution of domestic production 
relative to imports in aggregate supply. 
c) Heads of Government recognize that the successful execution 
of macro-economic policies contributes significantly to the improved 
performance of individual sectors. Accordingly, they give their 
broad endorsement to the action programmes as set out in the report 
to improve sectoral performance in export and domestic agriculture, 
livestock, agroindustry, fishery, forestry, manufacturing industry, 
tourism, energy, bauxite/alumina, and science, technology and 
information. 
3. The Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee (CDCC) 
a) Strategy for the Caribbean Countries during the Third 
Development Decade 
Five years ago the CDCC approved the report called Strategy 
for the Caribbean Countries during the Third Development Decade. IV 
Following upon analysis of the report the member countries 
recognized a fundamental role to planning and national economic 
management. Accordingly, Governments declared that planning 
activities will undoubtedly take various shapes, from central 
planning to management of resources within open market relationships. 
But in all cases the process will demand, together with a high 
degree of flexibility and due attention to the international 
scenario, increasingly sophisticated resources of knowledge and 
abilities. In view of the specificities, size and structure of 
sub-regional societies, there will be a need to monitor more 
closely internal and external changes, in order to increase the 
efficiency of management and optimize the control over an elusive 
environemnt. 
1/ ECLAC, Strategy for the Caribbean Countries during the 
Third Development Decade, United Nations, CDCC, ECLAC, Office 
for the Caribbean, 1980. 
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To cope with the Caribbean challenqes the mentioned strategy 
stated that beyond the problems of investments, adequate combination 
©f productive factors and expansion of the productive capacity, 
the key to planning during the 1980s appears to be summarized 
in the word negotiations: negotiations in the international fora 
and negotiation in the national contexts. To be effective, the 
plan or its substitute must gradually become the net result of a 
concerted action of society, based on collective choices and 
determination to achieve self-reliance, in spite of the severe 
pressures of limited financial resources. The plan will then be 
an instrument of arbitration in the search for equity. The 
success of this arbitration will depend on the degree of efficiency 
achieved by the managers in the public sector. 
Following with the argumentation the report adds: "the situation 
with respect to day-to-day economic management also calls for 
continuing attention. The long-standing problems of keeping the 
budgetary deficit under control through vigorous tax administration 
and enforcement; relentless effort to control the growth of 
recurrent expenditure (including remuneration in the public sector) 
and to secure greater cost effectiveness in government capital 
expenditure programmes and projects; to reduce - if not eliminate -
the current account deficit of public orporations and other state 
enterprises; and to keep deficit financing (borrowing from the 
Central Bank) within the limits set by available resources, including 
foreign exchange availabilities - all pose difficulties that require 
sustained effort in the search for solutions". 
Finally, in efforts to upgrading the level of economic management, 
the report concludes: "Apart from the question of overall national 
economic management there is a whole complex of problems involved 
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in the management of public corporations and state-owned producing 
and commercial enterprises. Here a number of issues arise: 
delegation of authority in operational matters within clearly 
articulated and, coherent policy frameworks; accountability to 
the political authorities, parliament and the public generally; 
setting of rates; tariffs and prices in such a manner as to cover 
operational costs, debt service and a contribution to the 
financing of capital investment programmes. More often than not, 
because of failure to resolve these issues, public corporations 
and state enterprises run enormous deficit, constituting a heavy 
burden on the Central Government budget and resulting in public 
sector and national "dissaving" instead of generating public 
sector and national savings'-'. 
b) Regional cooperation within the CDCC 
Within the functions and responsabilities of the CDCC, 
the system of cooperation and coordination among the Caribbean 
Planning Bodies have made valuable contributions. First, in the 
research field experts from the Region have prepared sectoral 
documents and also surveys of national planning experiences in 
the subregion. These contributions have promoted better programming 
efforts and implementation of projects. Second, in the training 
area there were held several seminars, courses and workshops in 
selected topics of high priority for the civil service oriented 
towards the efficient management of the available resources. Third, 
following the spirit of cooperation and integration the system 
have promoted and carried out the exchange of experiences in 
social and economic planning. 
The results of the past three meetings of planning officials 
held respectively in Havana (1979), Kingston (1980) and Port of 
Spain (1983) have emphasized the need of planning as a fundamental 
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tool for development in the Region. According to that, the CDCC 
Secretariat has reaffirmed in several sessions its support to the 
ad-hoc working groups of planners in agriculture, energy, manpower, 
physical and regional planning, transport and training. The ECLAC 
Port of Spain Office and ILPES have been in charge of the Secretariat 
of the meetings held so far. 
All of the above make it possible to conclude that the existing 
mechanism of cooperation among the Caribbean planners has contributed 
for a better common understanding and for an approach centered 
around rational and efficient use of resources. 
4. Planning and development in the Caribbean area -ILPES/ECLAC 
future action 
At the IV Conference of Ministers and Heads of Planning of 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Buenos Aires, 9-10 May, 1983) 
ILPES submitted for discussion the document entitled "Planning 
and Development in the Caribbean Area - Background and prospects". 
It was also analized at the Third Meeting of Caribbean Planning 
Officials held in Port of Spain, Trinidad, 19-25 January, 1983. 
On the basis of the role and challenges of planning as a 
fundamental component of the development strategy some points 
were stressed by way of conclusion: 
a) The fact that the Caribbean Island system is based on a 
fragile and dependent economic structure means that there are 
only a limited number of intersectoral links and multiplier effects, 
which gives rise to the need for a flexible and cidaptive planning 
system with a perspective which is regional but at the same 
time consistent and integrated at the national level on the 
basis of national development strategies.^/ 
1/ ILPES, Planning and Development in the Caribbean Area-
Background and Prospects, Santiago de Chile, 1983. 
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b) In the light of the experienced observed, planning needs 
to cut back on some of its administrative tasks and stress those 
which are related to the promotion and management of development. 
c) The technical and institutional bodies which come between 
the project (Micro) and the plan (macro) need to the harmonized 
and integrated so as to keep external aid from being dispelled 
and prevent the dispersion of state efforts into activities with 
little impact on global development policies. 
All of the above, as well as some other references, might make 
it possible to conclude that it is necessary to strengthen planning 
for understanding the complex challenges posed by the Caribbean 
economies. This seems to be the best way for more effective 
management of state activities and better allocation of available 
resources in view of the current critical situation. 
Accordingly and taking into consideration the work carried 
out in the field of training, research, horizontal cooperation 
and advisory services during the past ten years, ILPES has 
confirmed its commitment to the Caribbean by establishing a special 
Planning Unit jointly with ECLAC with duty station in its Port of 
Spain Office. This Unit will maintain close contacts with the 
Governments in an effort to provide technical support to the 
region's development. 
In response to the Government's jieeds and priorities the 
Planning Unit will promote the exchange of development experiences, 
plans, programmes and projects for planning. It will also carry 
out continuous analysis of progress in planning and obstacles to 
it and will promote closer links among the planning bodies in 
order to strengthen regional integration and cooperation in a 
way consistent with the related efforts of other institutions. 

